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The emergence of hybrid organizational structures that mix social and
financial goals, specifically the benefit corporation legal form and certified
B Corps, comes with promises that the social mission focus of these
businesses will generate numerous positive spillovers for their employees.
Benefit corporations are designed to provide greater attention to the
interests of non-owner stakeholders—particularly employees—and
employee treatment, voice, and participation are explicitly part of the B
Corp certification regime. However, as they are founded and mature it
remains unclear if these hybrid organizations make good on the promise to
actually provide an ideal vehicle for protecting and promoting employee
interests when compared to traditional corporate structures. This Article
first discusses the impetus for the benefit corporation and B Corps in the
context of corporate governance, the development of corporate social
responsibility theories, and the changing workplace. Drawing on
psychological contract theory and various trends in the U.S. employment
environment, I argue that benefit corporations and B Corps establish a new
psychological benefit contract (PBC) with their employees. I find that as
currently structured these new hybrid organizations will achieve mixed
results when promoting employee welfare and protection, empowerment
and voice, dignity, and other policy interests.
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A growing number of business leaders are also social entrepreneurs
seeking to successfully combine two seemingly divergent concepts: the
efficiency and profit producing aspects of a successful business and the
mission-driven, society-enhancing aspects of successful nonprofit entities.
There is a trend among some businesses toward social and financial goals
becoming more integrated
1
and increased support for a broader definition
1. See LYNN STOUT, SERGIO A. GRAMITTO & TAMARA BELINFANTI, CITIZEN
CAPITALISM: HOW A UNIVERSAL FUND CAN PROVIDE INCOME AND INFLUENCE TO ALL 66
(2019) (arguing that increased voluntary social disclosure in the last few years “anecdotally
demonstrates that the world of social concerns and the corporate world are moving closer
together,” and adding that “other aspects of this trend is include the rise of new corporate
forms such as ‘benefit corporations’ or ‘social purpose corporations,’ which are explicitly
formed to pursue both financial and social value creation; the establishment of social stock
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of business purpose even among traditional firms,
2
yet these pro-social
aims and profit goals—often conceived as social and financial
performance, respectively—can sometimes create friction among
stakeholders and even lead to mission drift.
3
Moreover, the mixed goals of
social and financial performance are not facilitated by U.S. corporate
law
4
—and in fact many believe the modern corporate governance
framework is dominated by a legal regime that requires managers to put
shareholder interests before all other stakeholder concerns.
5
To address this
tension there has been a concerted effort to develop a series of so-called
hybrid legal entities—businesses that aim to generate profits and pursue
social aims simultaneously
6
—to remove or otherwise neutralize this
exchanges, which are only available to corporations that commit to returning both financial
and social value.” The authors go on to add that “numerous studies . . . repeatedly show that
millennials want to work for companies that demonstrate values and ethics”).
2. SeeMarc Benioff, Opinion, We Need a New Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/benioff-salesforce-capitalism.html. Benioff,
as CEO of Salesforce, Inc. and a member of the Business Roundtable, has argued for a new
approach to understanding the purpose of business to address wealth inequality and a range
of social issues:
The culture of corporate America needs to change, and it shouldn’t take an act
of Congress to do it. Every C.E.O. and every company must recognize that
their responsibilities do not stop at the edge of the corporate campus. When we
finally start focusing on stakeholder value as well as shareholder value, our
companies will be more successful, our communities will be more equal, our
societies will be more just and our planet will be healthier.
Id.
3. See Alnoor Ebrahim, Julie Battilana & Johanna Mair, The Governance of Social
Enterprises: Mission Drift and Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations, 34 RES.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81 (2014) (exploring the governance challenges that
organizations that pursue a social mission must confront); Michael Pirson, Social
Entrepreneurship: A Blueprint for Humane Organizations?, in HUMANISM IN BUSINESS:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS SOCIETY 248, 249 (Heiko
Spitzeck et al. eds., 2009) (stating that “[s]ocial entrepreneurs . . . are largely credited with
having transformed and developed the third sector to become entrepreneurial and
competitive in precisely the same sense as businesses are”).
4. See Leo E. Strine, Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 241 (2014) (“American corporate law makes corporate managers
accountable to only one constituency—stockholders.”).
5. Lynne L. Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The Evolution of Conceptions of
“Good” Corporate Governance, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491, 494 (2017) (“Most legal
scholars take the triumph of the current shareholder value maximization conception of good
corporate governance as a given, so entrenched that it is unlikely to change.”).
6. In this Article, a broader definition than a strict legal view of a hybrid entity as only
applying to legal incorporation is used, which is consistent with management scholars view
of “hybrids” being defined by mixed goals within one entity (i.e., not just profit seeking or
just social goals). Nardia Haigh, John Walker, Sophie Bacq & Jill Kickul, Hybrid
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potential conflict.
7
Despite the best of intentions, is there a risk that these
legal formats and certified entities fail to reach the goal of generating
positive workplaces for their employees? In other words, what, if any, is
the connection between new hybrid legal forms or benefit compliance
certifications and worker interests? Or, worse, is there a risk that the new
legal forms or the voluntary compliance regimes may actually harm worker
welfare?
Thanks to the work of a variety of policy advocates over the last
decade, social entrepreneurs in the United States looking for an ideal
corporate legal form to assist in accomplishing their goals for bettering
society through business activity now have several options for how to
legally structure their organizations. In particular, hybrid business entities
can now formally incorporate in a number of ways, such as in the form of
benefit corporations, Social Purpose Organizations (SPCs) and low-profit
limited liability companies (L3Cs), which have begun to emerge in various
states.
8
Foremost among the legal forms is the benefit corporation, a type
Organizations: Origins, Strategies, Impacts, and Implications, 57 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5
(2015). These scholars craft a definition for hybrid organizations as follows:
[hybrids are] those enterprises that design their business models based on the
alleviation of a particular social or environmental issue. Hybrids generate
income and attract capital in ways that may be consistent with for-profit
models, nonprofit models, or both. Authors contributing work to this special
issue refer to hybrid organizations (or hybrids) by a variety of terms including
“social hybrid venture,” “benefit corporation,” and “hybrid firm,” but central to
the use of all terms is the duality of social impact alongside financial
sustainability. The term “hybrid organization” reflects the propensity of such
enterprises to blend traditionally for-profit practices with traditionally nonprofit
practices.
Id. at 5. But see FAQ, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/faq [https://perma.cc/ZU3W-
NFJZ ] (asserting that benefits are not “hybrids” under their definition).
7. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011). Reiser sums up the tension this
way:
Founders of social enterprises believe profits and social good can be produced
in tandem and wish to form organizations that will pursue these dual missions.
They will, however, encounter obstacles to articulating and enforcing such dual
missions if they adopt either a traditional nonprofit or for-profit form of
organization. Nonprofit forms bar profit distribution and for-profit forms will
create practical, if not legal, pressure to favor profit maximization over social
good when the two come into conflict. And these two imperatives will
certainly, at times, conflict.
Id. (citations omitted).
8. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and
Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2012); William H. Clark, Jr. et
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of corporation where the entity is set up to explicitly pursue both profit
making and social interests. The benefit corporation business form is, to
date, the most popular form of social enterprise legislation in the United
States, with the form now authorized by thirty five U.S. states and the
District of Columbia, and is also under consideration by several other
states.
9
Italy is the only country that has adopted benefit corporations into
law so far.
10
Concurrent with the development of benefit corporations, there is also
the closely-related B Corps certification designation from the nonprofit B
Labs, which also aims to alleviate this potential conflict between profits
and purpose through voluntarily adopted legal and regulatory structures.
11
The popularity of this designation is growing for companies of various
sizes. For example, there are now nearly three thousand B Corps scattered
al., The Need and Rationale for the Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that Best
Addresses the Needs of Social Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public,
BENEFITCORP. 14–15 (Jan. 18, 2013), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corp
oration _ White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EHN-QVX7].
9. DAN BROWN, HANNA DOWNING, AVA HAGHIGHI & CAROLINA HENRIQUEZ-SCHMITZ,
MAPPING THE STATE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND THE LAW 4 (2019), https://socentlawtracker.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Grunin-Tepper-Report_5_30_B.pdf [https://perma.cc/39Y
Z-NFZL]. In the 2019 edition of this annual report of the Grunin Center for Social
Enterprise Law at New York University Law School, authors found that Benefit
Corporations remain the dominant form of social enterprise legislation, specifically that:
Benefit corporations are the most popular, recognized by 35 states and the
District of Columbia. The L3C is offered in eight states, the BLLC in five
states, and the SPC in four states. Beyond the absolute number of social
enterprise laws adopted across the United States, the Social Enterprise Law
Tracker reveals a number of interesting trends in the social enterprise landscape.
The benefit corporation continues to be the most popular type of legal form,
although in 2018, it experienced more failed legislative attempts at enacting
authorizing statutes (six states) than any of the other entity types. While
certainly not as widely adopted, BLLCs [Benefit Limited Liability
Corporations] appear to be slowly gaining traction, with three bills under
consideration in 2018, two of which have since been enacted. SPCs have not
seen much activity in recent years, and legislative attempts at enacting L3C
statutes failed in three states in 2018.
Id. See also State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://www.benefitcorp.net
/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/S7FS-DT74] [hereinafter State by State
Status of Legislation] (cataloging benefit corporation information, including a tally of the
adopting states and the model legislation promoted by B Lab and its supporters).
10. The Italian law, which took effect in 2016, is the Italian Financial Act for 2016,
Law No. 208/2015 (2016). See Gianluca Riolfo, The New Italian Benefit Corporation, EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2019), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-New-Italian-Benef
it-Corporation-Riolfo/bfe7eae143b4c2b2bc1a8364dcbfbdbcba4f22df (analyzing the new
corporate model introduced in Italy in 2015).
11. Murray, supra note 8; Clark, supra note 8.
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across seventy-one countries.
12
The distinction between benefit
corporations (the legal corporate form) and B Corps (a certification
regime)—and the reasons why the distinctions are relatively unimportant
for the purposes of the psychological contract with employees of these
often overlapping models—is discussed in Part I.
By focusing on utilizing business techniques to achieve social goals
these hybrid companies are essentially embracing an ethical approach
centered on the positive social outcomes for stakeholders beyond profit
generation. In addition, these entities—and particularly the benefit
corporations and certified B Corps discussed in this Article—also aim for
ethical business operations and broad stakeholder engagement. This
approach is a direct response and rebuke of the shareholder maximization
corporate governance justification.
13
Also, unlike with traditional for-profit
corporations, the importance of stakeholder considerations, such as
fostering employee voice and participation,
14
are embedded in these
businesses’ incorporation documents and other corporate operations
guidelines.
15
In the case of B Corps, successfully attaining and keeping the
certification requires evidence of promoting employee welfare related to
voice mechanisms, ownership, and participation in firm decision-making.
16
The general view is that these hybrid legal entities and certified B
Corps are ethical and that this corporeal attribute extends to how workers
are treated overall.
17
Consequently there is a perception that employees are
12. B Lab, Overview (2019), https://www.bcorporation.net [https://perma.cc/2QHT-MS
SY].
13. See RICK ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE: PURSUING
PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 2 (2017) for a description of the genesis of the benefit corporation
becoming added to Delaware General Corporation Law at the encouragement of B Labs, the
B Corp certification organization, in part as a reaction to corporate governance rules that
focused only on shareholder interests.
B Lab has requirements for certification: first, the company must meet a strict
standard of social and environmental performance; second, the company must
have a corporate governance model that mandates accountability for all
stakeholder interests. For corporations, however, that second aspects violates
the shareholder primacy model central to traditional corporate law. . . .
Id.
14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Morrison, Employee Voice and Silence, 1 ANN. REV.
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 173 (2014) (discussing the
“upward voice” and which factors motivate employee participation).
15. B Lab, Meeting the Legal Requirement, https://bcorporation.net/certification/meet-t
he-requirements [https://perma.cc/AY8T-YK8N].
16. Clark, et al., supra note 8.
17. See, e.g., Janine S. Hiller, The Benefit Corporation and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 287 (2013) (providing details about the place of benefit
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better off working for hybrid entities than working for traditional for-profit
corporations. It is this ethical persona with regard to stakeholder
engagement that, in part, underlies the positive branding increasingly
associated with benefit corporations and B Corps. These companies are
diverse in terms of their size, industry, and location; and range from
apparel and lifestyle companies, to food producers, environmentally-
focused businesses, and a range of service providers. For now, publicly
traded B Corps and benefit corporations are rare. As discussed infra in Part
III.C. with a brief case study, the online retailer Etsy was originally a B
Corp, but eventually let the status lapse a few years after going public as a
result of having to address pressures from additional shareholders.
18
The potential for positive spillovers for a range of potential
stakeholders from these sorts of “doing well by doing good” companies is
clear and thoroughly discussed in both the academic and practitioner
literatures. However, an important question remains: are the embedded
employee engagement and empowerment dimension of benefit
corporations and certified B Corps entirely beneficial for employees? In
other words, do these hybrid entities live up to the claims and high
expectations that they facilitate worker empowerment and voice, and
enhance employee welfare (including along metrics of career advancement
and compensation) alongside other policy interests? While it may seem
that benefit corporations and B Corps are unambiguously advantageous for
their employees, there is more to the story beyond the rosy headlines and
prominent product labels about the benefits of these new types of
businesses when it comes to their employees. As the number and
complexity of hybrid entities increase, so does the number of employees
opting to work for these entities, and a closer examination of the tradeoffs
of working for a hybrid entity is warranted. This Article critically reviews
the supposed virtues of hybrid entities and B Corps when it comes to
empowering and benefiting their employees, including the impact these
firms have on employee dignity.
One instructive approach to understanding the employee dimension of
hybrid entities is to see this relationship as an example of an addendum to
the so-called “new psychological contract” in the workplace that has been
used to explain recent trends in employment law.
19
This unwritten contract
corporations in relation to society and corporate social responsibility).
18. David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2017, http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html.
19. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications for the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001)
(discussing how the changes to the psychological contract can lead to situations where
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deviates from the once traditional employee-employer relationship that was
based on employee loyalty in exchange for job security and gradually
increasing remuneration correlated to job tenure, which has broken down in
the last few decades.
20
The approach in this Article is to examine the
implicit set of promises that are now arising between hybrid entities and
their employees. I characterize this exchange between hybrid firms and
their employees as what I call a psychological benefit contract (PBC).
The arguments that benefit corporations and B Corps have a new
psychological contract with employees draws on the well-known
psychological contract theory (PCT) developed by business organizations
scholars to explain the evolving employer-employee relationship.
21
PCT
posits that the employer-employee relationship is marked by the parties’
understanding of the nature of the relationship and expectations for current
and future interactions, which are shaped by forces like culture and law.
22
The psychological contract sets expectations of employee tenure, job
training, or even flexible work hours, that are not necessarily legally
enforceable rights.
23
PCT is useful for exploring and critiquing the
supposed benefits of hybrid entities to promote employee welfare because
it helps explain the balance between the parties’ interests.
The PBC is in essence a new version of the existing general
psychological contract in the workplace, and this version is marked, on one
side, by benefits and assurances (both voluntarily assumed legal and ethical
obligations) provided by the employer under the auspices of being designed
as a hybrid entity pursuing simultaneous social and financial goals. These
include the admirable ethical treatment of workers and clearly demarcated
avenues for employee voice and participation in management, alongside a
range of workplace benefits that vary across companies. An intangible
benefit may be the job satisfaction and “feel good effect” related to helping
achieve a social mission or the ethical perspective embedded in hybrid
entities from their inception.
24
On the other side of the agreement are
employers demand more loyalty through mechanisms such as restrictive covenants, but at
the same time employers may provide less to employees in terms of reduced job security).
20. Id. at 552.
21. See generally DENISE M. ROUSSEAU, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS IN
ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDINGWRITTEN ANDUNWRITTENAGREEMENTS (Gillian Dickens
ed., 1995) (providing a theory of psychological contracting); Denise M. Rousseau,
Psychological Contracts in the United States: Diversity, Individualism, and Associability in
the Marketplace, in PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS IN EMPLOYMENT: CROSS-NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 251 (Denise M. Rousseau & René Schalk eds., 2000).
22. ROUSSEAU, PSYCHOLOGICALCONTRACTS INORGANIZATIONS, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Joseph W. Yockey, Using Form to Counter Corruption: The Promise of
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implicit promises from the employee to remain loyal to the entity and to
wholeheartedly engage in the collective efforts to achieve those social and
business goals. This Article, infra in Part III, also explores some largely
unintended ways that the new PBC in hybrid entities may undermine
worker welfare in terms of things such as job mobility, advancement, and
possible compromises related to wages and benefits.
Much of the focus thus far in the discussion of hybrids, such as B
Corp certified companies and benefit corporations, is on the
institutionalization of social entrepreneur’s beyond-the-bottom-line goals
and ethos in a business and legal format.
25
This Article, in contrast, focuses
on both the potential positive impact and drawbacks of benefit corporations
and B Corps on the important topic of employee welfare. In Part I, the
Article first explains the impetus for the benefit corporation in the context
of corporate governance, the development of stakeholder and corporate
social responsibility (CSR) theories, and the ensuing debate. It also
explains the development and characteristics of the B Corp certification
regime, while focusing on the employee dimension of the accreditation
requirements.
Next, Part II briefly examines the evolving nature of the modern
employment relationship and the changing workplace in the United States
to establish the context for the state of employee-employer relations
generally. Part III contains a theoretical discussion of psychological
contract theory. In that section I also argue that a new example of a
psychological contract—the psychological benefit contract—arises
between any entity with mixed social and profit goals and its employees. It
then explores and evaluates how these entities may promote employee
welfare and protection, worker empowerment and voice, dignity, positive
branding to attract talented employees, and other policy interests. A set of
conclusions follow. These include suggestions for additional research to
the Public Benefit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 641 (2015) (concluding that, in
the context of benefit corporations and anti-corruption efforts, “[i]t is difficult for values to
take root in a firm without a strong expression of organizational ethics and ideals. The more
complex, varied, or inconsistent those values appear to be, the harder it will be for agents to
discern them—let alone internalize them” and the public benefit corporation form “mitigates
this risk by coming off the rack with a clear sense of mission.”) (citation omitted).
25. ANDREW KASSOY, BART HOULAHAN & JAY COEN GILBERT, BROOKINGS INST.,
IMPACT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF CAPITALISM TO
ACHIEVE A SHARED ANDDURABLE PROSPERITY 2 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/07/b_corps.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EW7-B3BL] (“For business to be a
long-term agent of change, two things are needed: First, legal innovation is necessary to
align the interests of business with the interests of society and to allow companies and
investors to pursue a higher purpose than just profit maximization, especially as they scale
using the capital markets.”) (emphasis in original).
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further explore the nature of hybrid entities’ relationship to employee-
stakeholders.
I. BENEFITCORPORATIONS, B CORPS, AND THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITYCONTEXT
With the social entrepreneurship movement in the last few decades, it
became clear that harnessing management techniques to achieve social
goals could lead to positive outcomes beyond what traditional nonprofit
and government models could reliably produce.
26
In part, benefit
corporations have their origin in related concerns that the positive results of
the rigor and discipline of business efficiency in pursuit of profits is in
conflict with the mission-driven decision-making and stakeholder focus of
nonprofit organizations. Thus, the advent of benefit corporations can be
interpreted as a legal innovation to solidify and protect hybrid
organizations from claims that traditional corporations legally must pursue
shareholder value maximization. In addition to benefit corporation legal
designation, B Corp certification requires firms to voluntarily adopt a series
of policies for social outcomes focused on the environment and non-owner
stakeholders, especially employees.
In order to better understand the place of employee interests within the
benefit corporation model of governance, it is useful to first take a forward
looking view of what the hybrid economy, in its extended and mature form,
might look like to consumers. Second, this Part examines the impetus for
reform that led to the new legal incorporation format. Finally, the third
section of this Part places the search for a new legal option for social
entrepreneurs in the context of the longstanding corporate social
responsibility debate in the United States.
A. The Promise of a World Dominated by B Corps and Benefit
Corporations
Imagine, for a moment, a world where you are a conscientious
consumer living happily in “B Corpia,” a state where all of the companies
(i.e., the for-profit organizations) are certified B Corps. This enlightened
jurisdiction where you happen to reside has also recently enacted benefit
corporation legislation, so many of those companies are likely incorporated
as benefit corporations, or will soon be, as a way of legally committing to a
series of social and financial ideals. These aspirations include taking into
26. Id.
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account the interests of a range of stakeholders—not just the owners—
whenever making decisions and implementing corporate policies. This is
all in pursuit of dual goals of making a profit like corporations have done
for centuries alongside explicit social goals (i.e., the so-called triple bottom
line of measuring success with the positive impact on people, planet, and
profits). For social entrepreneurs, the State of B Corpia is their version of a
utopian world where all the businesses pursue a social and environmental
mission, all while making a profit—and while considering broad
stakeholder interests.
In your home state that you are beginning to imagine, you will be
pleased to know that on any given day you could eat well and consume a
wide variety of appealing products and use many quality services all day
long—and feel good about your choices, too. With the B Lab
organizations directory of nearly 3,000 certified B Corps in seventy-one
countries across 150 industries as your guide,
27
you can now embrace the
“B Corp Movement” from sunrise to sunset, from your morning beverage
(Equator or Stumptown Coffee, or Bigelow Tea, perhaps), to your breakfast
yogurt (Stonyfield Organic, or soon Danone’s range of products may be an
option if it is certified as planned), to a healthy and tasty lunch and dinner
at home or at a restaurant (Cabot Creamery, Bamboo Sushi, Walden Local
Meats, Tofurky, Real Oyster Cult oysters, Native American Natural
Foods), or with things you bake on your own (King Arthur Flour). You
could also top it off with some delicious ice cream (Ben & Jerry’s or
Bluemarble) or a bite of chocolate (Tony’s Chocolonely, Divine Chocolate,
or Lake Champaign Chocolates). In this world you could also purchase
fashionable, eco-friendly and ethical clothing and footwear (Patagonia,
Eileen Fisher, or Toms shoes), perhaps to wear on a trip you are planning
(visit.org or Bodhi Surf + Yoga). You could even feel good about
engaging with the services and products ranging from your home health
aide, your internet service provider, environmental consultant, architect,
yoga instructor, car dealer, wind and solar energy company—or even your
lawyer.
28
Throughout this day you could also pause to reflect on the products
and services of some companies in your community that you are supporting
as they pursue their noble social and environmental causes, which are
27. For the update to date count of the number of certified B Corps, see the B Labs
website homepage at bcorporation.net [https://perma.cc/2QHT-MSSY] (last visited Aug. 1,
2019).
28. For a comprehensive list of these B Corps and the nearly 3,000 currently certified B
Corp businesses, visit the listing on the B Labs website at bcorporation.net/directory [https://
perma.cc/Y2QY-KM9P], which permits searches by name, industry, and region.
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baked into these hybrid business models. For example, some of these B
Corps have open hiring plans that hire workers regardless of their work
experience and social histories (Greyston Bakery,
29
whose brownies are in
some of those Ben & Jerry’s ice cream options) or focus on hiring workers
without asking about criminal records, in part to aid their return to society
after prison (Cascade Engineering).
30
Finally, at the end of this busy day
you can toast to yourself for a life well lived and without any ethical
compromise or angst about your consumption choices—whether it is with a
beer (New Belgium, Brewgooder, Brewery Vivant, and others), a glass of
red or white wine (Fetzer Winery), or even a fine port wine (Symington
brands).
As appealing as it sounds, this state does not really exist—at least not
yet. While this mythical world of B-Corp only business that was just
described is not yet solidified, these are all current B Corps or examples of
products and services from B Corp populated industries, even if they are
not now available with easy access all in one place. As you can gather
from the parenthetical examples of real B Corps and benefit corporations,
some are household names for sale in nearly every convenience store or
outdoor equipment retailer worldwide, while others are only familiar to
their clients or customers in their specific region.
In this mythical world of the State of B Corpia, it is easy to engage
with social enterprises that profess to serve both financial and social
interests. However, in the real world of complex corporate governance
structures where we all must live, there is actually an increasing level of
access to these B Corps and others, assuming these firms have the scale and
distribution network to reach your local store, or at a minimum your
mailbox. Because of this increase in access, both for consumers and for
employees of these hybrid entities, B Corps and benefit corporations
deserve some additional scrutiny on how they serve one key stakeholder
group: their employees.
29. Open Hiring, GREYSTON, https://greyston.org/open-hiring/ [https://perma.cc/LUU6-
YBWS]. See also Tina Rosenberg, No Background Check, Drug Test or Credit Check.
You’re Hired!, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2019 (describing the Open Hiring approach by stating,
“[i]f you want a job at Greyston Bakery in Yonkers, N.Y., just north of the Bronx, it’s
yours. There’s no background check, drug test, credit check or call to references. Greyston
won’t even interview you.” This is because the bakery hires anyone who add their name to
a waitlist and “[w]hen a job comes open and your name is next, you start work as a paid
apprentice.”).
30. For the Cascade Engineering hiring policy and position on Returning Citizens, see
Returning Citizens, CASCADE ENGINEERING, http://cascadeng.com/returning-citizens [https://
perma.cc/6FF9-MWX7].
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B. Background on the Benefit Corporation and B Corp Movements
For decades, the dominant model of social engagement in the U.S.
was in the form of charitable donations flowing from wealthy patrons.
Philanthropy (i.e., charity) has long been an important source of funding
for social missions in the nonprofit context. However, since the 1990s
business-minded individuals who wanted to use their commercial skills to
better society have begun to experiment with variations of the existing
business models. These so-called social entrepreneurs want to solve
societal problems using business-focused techniques.
31
Accordingly,
“social entrepreneurs believe social good can be produced along with
profits and desire hybrid forms of organization to smooth a single
enterprise’s path to realizing both goals.”
32
To pursue this mix of business and social goals, several hybrid legal
formats have been proposed and adopted into state law across the country.
In a few years, five types of “blended” or hybrid legal forms have been
adopted in various jurisdictions.
33
The benefit corporation, first enacted in
Maryland in 2010,
34
has now been adopted into law by thirty-five states,
with other states still considering draft legislation to authorize benefit
corporations.
35
The effort to promote the passage of the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation (MBCL) across the U.S. is spearheaded by the nonprofit B
Lab,
36
which began its efforts in 2006.
37
The model legislation includes a
third-party standard provision, and B Lab certification is the leader among
numerous available certification regimes. The third-party standard
31. See, e.g., Pirson, supra note 3 (discussing how businesses can implement social
entrepreneurship). For a further discussion of the usage of “social enterprise,” see Murray,
Choose Your Own Master, supra note 8, at 4 n.4.
32. Reiser, supra note 7, at 591.
33. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 8, at 4–5 (mentioning states
adopting legislation allowing low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”) and benefit
corporations, as well as states with the similar benefit limited liability company statute
(“BLLC”), flexible purpose corporation statute (“FPC”), or a social purpose corporation
(“SPC”)).
34. Reiser, supra note 7, at 594.
35. State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 9.
36. See B Lab, How to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://be
nefitcorp.net/policymakers/how-pass-benefit-corporation-legislation [https://perma.cc/95KX
-SQTP] (“B Lab has assisted in passing the laws in all states that have enacted it and we are
working on passing it in the majority of the remaining states”).
37. See About B Lab, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-pr
ofit-behind-b-corps/our-history [https://perma.cc/5S5V-TWMJ] (discussing the founding
principles and history of the B Lab nonprofit).
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requirement for benefit corporations is intended to serve a transparency and
accountability function to ensure that the entities continue to pursue their
stated mission.
38
Notably, corporate entities—including traditional for-profit
corporations and limited liability companies, and L3Cs—are eligible to
pursue B Lab’s extensive B Corp certification process, and not just the
formal, state-level authorized benefit corporation incorporation option.
39
To receive the B Lab certification, a business must be a corporate entity
(i.e., not a sole proprietorship or a nonprofit) and either currently be a
benefit corporation, or become a benefit corporation if the state of
incorporation allows for the designation.
40
Alternatively, if becoming a
benefit corporation is unavailable in the state of incorporation, the firm
must amend its articles of incorporation to adopt an expanded set of duties
to consider social mission and stakeholder interests in addition to
shareholder interests.
41
The social purpose embedded in the model of either a benefit
corporation or a certified B Corp, by design, also has implications for
internal stakeholders. For example, B Lab has provided model language to
be added to an entity’s articles of incorporation.
42
The language addresses
legal concerns that the default fiduciary duties under state corporate
governance law are inadequate to protect directors’ decisions that may
balance stakeholder concerns or long-term interests to the detriment of
shareholders.
43
Specifically, B Lab’s suggested language to amend articles
38. Transparency, in the form of corporate disclosure, is an important part of modern
social reporting regimes. See David Hess, The Transparency Trap: Non-Financial
Disclosure and the Responsibility of Business to Respect Human Rights, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 5,
6 (2019) (noting that “[t]he regulation of business through mandatory public disclosures is
ubiquitous. For instance, the primary tool of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is disclosure, not substantive regulation of a company’s governance.”). See also Jill
E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 924 (2019) for a
discussion of the reporting options related to disclosing the environmental impacts of
corporate actors (i.e., sustainability), with the options that are used generally in social
reporting (“Experts also use a variety of terms to describe corporate sustainability and
sustainability reporting. Among these are ‘CSR’ (Corporate Social Responsibility), ‘ESG’
(Environmental, Social, and Governance), ‘triple bottom line,’ and ‘societal impact.’”). Id.
at 932. These approaches to corporate disclosure are sometimes also described as “non-
financial” disclosures. Id. at 931.
39. See B Lab, Certification, https://www.bcorporation.net/certification [https://perm a.
cc/5E6V-SFQE] (detailing the benefits of b-corp certification).
40. See B Lab, Meeting the Legal Requirement, supra note 15 (describing the
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of a corporation states, in part, that a director:
shall give due consideration to the following factors, including,
but not limited to, the long-term prospects and interests of the
Company and its [shareholders], and the social, economic, legal,
or other effects of any action on the current and retired
employees, the suppliers and customers of the Company or its
subsidiaries, and the communities and society in which the
Company or its subsidiaries operate, (collectively, with the
[shareholders], the “Stakeholders”), together with the short-term,
as well as long-term, interests of its [shareholders] and the effect
of the Company’s operations (and its subsidiaries’ operations) on
the environment and the economy of the state, the region and the
nation.
44
Interestingly, the language mandates the consideration of the impact
of any decision on employees—even retired employees—as key
stakeholders. Also of note is that the language states that it is not “intended
to create or shall create or grant any right in or for any person other than a
[shareholder] or any cause of action by or for any person other than a
[shareholder].”
45
The mechanism for a shareholder suit to enforce the
promise of pursuing a social mission, the benefit enforcement proceeding,
is spelled out in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation.
46
In effect, this
provision explicitly acknowledges the corporate governance primacy of
shareholders, thus eliminating any doubts that other stakeholders may have
standing to enforce compliance with the benefit corporation’s stated social
mission or stakeholder engagement.
C. Benefit Corporations and B Corps in the CSR Context
The seemingly perennial debate over the proper purpose of the
corporation, and if there is a social responsibility for corporations, can be
simplified—albeit perhaps oversimplified—to opposing models: a





46. Model Benefit Corporation Legislation § 305 (2019), http://www.benefitcorp.net/sit
es/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf. [https://perm
a.cc/B9CH-E4LQ] See also Clark, et al., supra note 8, at 17–19 (stating that benefit
corporations must file an annual report that describes how they pursued a social mission,
using a third-party standard).
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shareholder theory versus a stakeholder theory of the corporation.
47
On one
side, the stakeholder model takes a view of responsibility that goes beyond
maximizing shareholder interests to consider other stakeholders, such as
customers, supplier communities, societal elements, the environment, and
particularly internal stakeholders such as employees.
48
Companies may
voluntarily move in a stakeholder-centric direction, perhaps because some
“recognize the economic benefits of being perceived as a ‘good corporate
citizen.’”
49
Some companies will “go to considerable lengths to develop
this perception . . . [to] deliberately position themselves in their media
relations to appeal to consumers through this strategy,” while others “have
chosen to incorporate or reincorporate themselves as ‘benefit corporations’
explicitly dedicated to pursuing social and environmental goals.”
50
In contrast, the shareholder-centric explanation of the corporation—
and corporate purpose—sees the entity as a vehicle for maximizing the
interests of owners, with other groups having subservient interests that are,
in theory, protected by a modest level of government oversight.
51
Historically, the origins of a manager’s primary duty, enshrined in
corporate governance rules, to serve shareholders and their interests before
considering other stakeholders or societal concerns
52
is traced to the early
twentieth century writing of Adolf Berle and Gardner Means.
53
The agency
47. See, e.g., John Mackey, Putting Customers Ahead of Investors, REASON (Oct. 25,
2005), http://www2.pitt.edu/~woon/courses/mackey.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7SB-KLKJ]. In
this essay that was part of a debate with shareholder Mackey, the co-founder and former
CEO of Whole Foods Market, arguing for his belief:
that the enlightened corporation should try to create value for all of its
constituencies. From an investor’s perspective, the purpose of the business is to
maximize profits. But that’s not the purpose for other stakeholders-for
customers, employees, suppliers, and the community. Each of those groups will
define the purpose of the business in terms of its own needs and desires, and
each perspective is valid and legitimate.
Id.
48. Yves Fassin, The Stakeholder Model Refined, 84 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 113–35 (2009)
(discussing the evolution of stakeholder categorizations over the previous 25 years).
49. STOUT, GRAMITTO&BELINFANTI, supra note 1, at 64.
50. Id. (citing Suntae Kim, Matthew J. Karlesky, Christopher G. Myers & Todd
Schifeling, Why Companies Are Becoming B Corporations, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 17,
2016)).
51. For perhaps the most often-cited articulation of shareholder profit maximization as
the purpose of business, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMESMAG., Sept. 1970, at 17.
52. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15–23 (2012) (describing the
history of shareholder primacy arguments in the United States).
53. ADOLF BERLE & GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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concerns discussed by management academics Michael Jensen and William
Meckling are also credited with helping to solidify the shareholder primacy
focus of managers.
54
Milton Friedman’s 1970 magazine article The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits is the best known and most influential
response to arguments that stakeholders should be considered in corporate
decision-making.
55
Friedman’s essay is reacting to early calls for corporate
social responsibility, and his primarily assertion is that, “[t]here is one and
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition
without deception or fraud.”
56
While Friedman recognized that managers
are moral actors with philanthropic desires, he relegated those interests to
their non-work life and essentially rejected a role for any sort of humanistic
management. On the contrary, he argued that “in practice the doctrine of
social responsibility is frequently a cloak for actions that are justified on




it may well be in the long-run interest of a corporation that is a
major employer in a small community to devote resources to
providing amenities to that community or to improving its
government [because that] may make it easier to attract desirable
employees, it may reduce the wage bill or lessen losses from
pilferage and sabotage or have other worthwhile effects.
58
Friedman’s conclusion is that corporate actions, while they may have
positive impact on stakeholders beyond shareholders (including
employees), are justified because they are in the self-interest of the
business and its owners, not out of a goal of pursing social responsibility.
59
PROPERTY (1932). But see E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (offering a contrasting view in the early debate over
the role of corporate fiduciaries). For a discussion of the Berle-Dodd debate about the
corporation, see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (2002).
54. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (developing a
theory of the ownership structure of the firm).




59. See id. (arguing that “this is one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as a by-
product of expenditures that are entirely justified on its own self-interest”).
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In contrast, proponents of the stakeholder model of managerial
decision-making for the corporation argue that the interests of non-owner
stakeholders must also be considered along with shareholders’ interests.
60
Initial conceptions of the stakeholder model of the corporation include
primary stakeholders such as employees, customers, and suppliers.
61
Over
time scholars have argued that other stakeholders’ interests warrant
managerial consideration, including more abstract concerns such as
working with the government, the media, or defending the environment.
62
Legal scholars have also often entered this broad discussion about the
proper role of the corporation in society and the legal parameters for
decisions motivated by goals other than so-called shareholder value
maximization. Notably Professor Lynn Stout asserted that long-held
assumptions from non-lawyer academics and some businesspeople that the
corporate governance laws require shareholder primacy are false and
otherwise misguided.
63
Stout argued at length that the misunderstanding of
corporate law on the issue of shareholder primacy and maximizing
shareholder value is harmful to the interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders, and society.
64
Other commentators also conclude that fears of
a shareholder maximization constraint on a director’s discretion are both
widely held and mistaken.
65
In addition, the American Law Institute’s
60. See generally R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984) (detailing the elements and concerns of the stakeholder approach).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Fassin, supra note 48 (discussing Freeman’s original stakeholder model
and subsequent additions to stakeholder theory leading to an “adapted stakeholder model”).
63. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 164 (2008) (criticizing the importance of a seminal case). But see Jonathan R. Macey,
A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177
(2008) (critiquing Stout’s critique of the well-known Dodge v. Ford case, which was
decided in 1919).
64. See STOUT, supra note 52 (challenging shareholder interest maximization as a
requirement of United States corporate governance law). See also Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736–37 (2005)
(challenging assumptions that a corporation’s managers must solely maximize shareholder
profits).
65. See, e.g., Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A
Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13,
2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-corporat
ions-a-harmful-dichotomy/ [https://perma.cc/R6Z5-2A4J] (discussing the impact of strongly
differentiating between benefit corporations and other forms of incorporation). The
shareholder interest maximization debate has had a somewhat renewed life based on recent
rebuttals to Stout and others from Leo Strine, then Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court. See Leo E. Strine, Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014);
Strine, Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, supra note 4; Leo E.
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Principles of Corporate Governance makes clear that the directors of
traditional corporations retain the discretion to consider a range of issues
when executing their business judgment, including social and stakeholder
issues.
66
The management literature on stakeholder theory provides some
insight into the aspirational role of these new models. For example,
stakeholder theory proponents assert that stakeholder salience—including
traditional primary stakeholders like employees—is higher and more
influential than the influence of expanded stakeholders included in a
broader view of the firm, such as governments and communities.
67
This
debate over the purpose of the corporation and managerial responsibilities
under the law continues in various forums, perhaps most pointedly in the
context of corporate social responsibility discussions.
68
Yet despite these convincing arguments from some legal academics
(particularly Stout)
69
that managers already have the discretion to make
long-term decisions that take into account the interest of non-shareholder
stakeholders, concerns over constraints on managerial discretion have
remained.
70
Many in the social entrepreneurship community continue to
have concerns over managers and directors’ discretion when operating in a
traditional corporate structure because of arguably mixed judicial
interpretations of the scope of their fiduciary duties.
71
This is all happening
amid a world of corporate governance where more companies are engaging
Strine, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012).
66. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994). The guidelines
state initially that a corporation “should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.” In addition, a
firm, “[m]ay take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as
appropriate to the responsible conduct of business,” and “[m]ay devote a reasonable amount
of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes.” Id.
67. See Bradley R. Agle, Ronald K. Mitchell & Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, Who Matters to
CEOs? An Investigation of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience, Corporate Performance,
and CEO Values, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 507, 520 (1999).
68. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, Opinion, The Case Against Corporate Social
Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405 27
48703338004575230112664504890 (arguing that CSR is ineffective and even harmful, and
that social outcomes should remain with the authority and responsibility of government
actors, not with businesses). For further discussion, see infra, Part I.C.
69. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 52, at 11 (“[M]aximizing shareholder value is not a
requirement; it is just one possible corporate objective out of many.”).
70. See Strine, supra note 4, at 241–42 (describing how the current corporate
“accountability structure” exclusively favors stockholders’ interests in managerial decision-
making).
71. Clark et al., supra note 8, at 7–14.
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in voluntary sustainability disclosure that, along with the rise of benefit
corporations, is said to be part of a trend of the merging of the worlds of
social concern and corporate matters.
72
As a result, the efforts to find a suitable corporate legal form to
enshrine the hybrid entity as a vehicle for social entrepreneurship continue,
with one result being the now relatively widespread adoption of the benefit
corporation since 2010.
73
Simultaneously, the nature of work and how
employees related to employers in the United States is also in transition.
These workplace trends are the subject of the next section.
II. THE EVOLVINGNATURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND THEU.S.
WORKPLACE
In the last few decades there have been significant changes to the
work environment of U.S. employees and their expectations. During this
same period, the corporate social responsibility of business and the proper
role of managers have been the subject of a heated debate. This section
briefly discusses some of the major trends that underlie the changing
workplace and provides context for the place and possible impacts of
benefit corporations and B Corp compliance on their employees.
Over the course of the late 20th century, major shifts in the
employment relationship began occurring in the U.S. labor market. In a
pronounced shift, the size of organized labor and collective bargaining
agreements precipitously declined.
74
As a result, the protections for some
workers that came with unions are potentially lost. However, another shift
has occurred: a steep rise in the number of contingent workers, also known
as temporary workers.
75
The number of these workers has grown and
72. STOUT, GRAMITTO&BELINFANTI, supra note 1, at 66. Of note is a recent statement
from the 200 CEOs that make up the Business Roundtable that seemingly changes course
and abandons an earlier adherence to the goal of shareholder value maximization:
Breaking with decades of long-held corporate orthodoxy, the Business Roundtable issued a
statement on “the purpose of a corporation,” arguing that companies should no longer
advance only the interests of shareholders. Instead, the group said, they must also invest in
their employees, protect the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their suppliers.
David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top
C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2019, http://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/busi
ness-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html.
73. STOUT, GRAMITTO&BELINFANTI, supra note 1, at 66.
74. See, e.g., There’s an App for That, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.ec
onomist.com/briefing/2014/12/30/theres-an-app-for-that (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics
data that union membership in the U.S. has declined by half since the 1990s).
75. See, e.g., Alison Davis-Blake & Joseph P. Broschak, Outsourcing and the Changing
Nature of Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 321, 322 (2009) (describing how the increased use of
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doubled as a percentage of the workforce.
76
Under the older model of
unions, “everybody seemed to benefit” because “workers got security,
benefits and steady wage rises; companies got a stable workforce in which
they could invest with a fair expectation of returns.”
77
One interesting result of the use of technology for employees and
contingent workers is the recent increase in “on-demand” online labor-
based business in the so-called gig economy. This includes business
models such as platform-based transportation services like Uber and Lyft
or targeted personal service platforms like TaskRabbit or Handy, which
highlights this trend toward untethered freelance work.
78
The connotation
of “freelancer” suggests a level of autonomy that could be the next stage in
a long line of changes to the nature of work as great as the demise of the
guild system, the advent of the industrial revolution, and the rise and fall of
organized labor movements.
79
Some scholars point out that there is reason
to be skeptical of employee prospects in the new on-demand economy
because of evidence of firms’ opportunistic behavior and the difficulty of
these dispersed employee networks to organize and push for better
treatment.
80
Employment and labor law researchers have noted the impact of these
macroeconomic shifts in the labor market on workers’ relationship to
employers, particularly in the new knowledge economy where use of
intellectual property and information management is more prominent than
traditional manufacturing.
81
The widespread use of technology to improve
contingent workers, including outsourcing, has changed the nature of work and the
workplace).
76. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 74.
77. See id. (“But the model started to get into trouble in the 1970s, thanks first to
deteriorating industrial relations and then to globalisation and computerization.”).
78. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 74 (suggesting through the subtitle of the article—
“There’s an app for that”—that “[f]reelance workers available at a moment’s notice will
reshape the nature of companies and the structure of careers.”).
79. As one discussion of the on-demand work model put it:
The huge companies created by the Industrial Revolution brought armies of workers
together, often under a single roof . . . this was a step down for many independent artisans
who could no longer compete with machine-made goods; it was a step up for day-labourers
who had survived by selling their labour to gang masters.
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 74.
80. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 100 (2017)
(pointing out that “Uber drivers probably lack the sorts of communal ties that often enable
worker organizing”).
81. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy:
Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital
Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006) (discussing the rise of the
knowledge economy in the U.S. and implications for employee-employer contracting). See
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efficiency in the workplace has also had important effects on the
application of U.S. employment law.
82
For example, the treatment and status of on-demand drivers for
services like Lyft and Uber have led to numerous legal battles. In one case,
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc., Uber has argued that its drivers were
independent contractors and not employees under California labor laws.
83
An attempt to settle the case for $100 million was rejected in August 2016
as inadequate by the court, and other similar cases in the U.S. and
elsewhere continue over the status of contingent workers.
84
While rulings
on the permissibility of Uber’s class action waiver clauses has led to class
action de-certification for most plaintiffs in the O’Connor case
85
and a
recent settlement proposal by Uber, the question of the employee status of
these sorts of gig economy drivers remains unclear.
86
In another development in this area of law from early 2018, in
Dynamex v. Superior Court of Los Angeles the California Supreme court
adopted a new test for determining a worker’s status as an employee and
not an independent contractor.
87
The test used in California now presumes
that when a worker is hired they are an employee, not an independent
contractor.
88
While the full implications of the Dynamex case are not yet
clear for gig economy companies, it is likely they will have a more difficult
time classifying workers as independent contractors going forward.
89
The automation of human work due to technological advances and the
improvement of artificial intelligence is another often discussed trend in the
also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The
Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 313–14
(2003) (noting the impact of new information technology and global labor markets on
employees’ declining bargaining power).
82. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology:
Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L. J. 1, 27 (2001).
83. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 6354534 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 5, 2013).
84. Joel Rosenblatt & Edvard Pettersson, Uber Deal Offers Drivers $1 Each to Wipe
Away Labor Threats Valued in Billions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2017-02-02/uber-to-pay-7-75-million-to-settle-california-drivers-suit.
85. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2018).
86. Joel Rosenblatt, Uber to Pay $20 Million to Settle Driver Classification Suit,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 12, 2019), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-12/uber-to
-pay-20-million-to-settle-driver-classification-lawsuit.
87. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A., 416 P.3d 1, 34 (Cal. 2018)
(adopting the so-called “ABC” test for determining employee status).
88. Id.
89. Hassan A. Kanu, Erin Mulvaney & Patrick Dorrian, California Independent
Contractor Test Applies Retroactively, BLOOMBERG L. (May 2, 2019), https://news.bloombe
rglaw.com/daily-labor-report/california-independent-contractor-test-applies-retroactively.
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U.S. workplace. The concern is that firms will be able to increasingly
automate tasks, jobs will disappear, and the employment relationship will
suffer. Predictions vary as to the likely consequences of automation with
some well-publicized estimates that nearly half of U.S. jobs could be
impacted,
90
although these large estimates have been tempered by
clarification that these are in fact the top of the possible predicted range.
91
Nonetheless, historical evidence demonstrates how technological
advancements can also create new jobs and industries.
92
Management
scholars have further described the potential benefits of automation in
terms of opportunities for new efficiencies and job creation even among job
destruction for some employees.
93
Alongside the challenges to the role of
the gig economy—from the back and forth estimates of the significance of
the gig economy itself and role of future automation—policy makers are
still trying to get a sense of the scope of the economic and moral
implications of new patterns in technological displacement of traditional
work.
94
Aside from concerns related to contingent and on demand workers,
another important technology-enabled trend is remote work whereby
employees, to varying degrees, work outside of traditional centralized
office environments. These flexible work arrangements have been on the
rise over the last few years.
95
Remote work arrangements can have benefits
90. Automation and Anxiety: The Impact on Jobs, THE ECONOMIST (June 23, 2016), http
://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/06/23/automation-and-anxiety (citing research
that “47% of workers in America had jobs at high risk of potential automation”).
91. Will a Robot Really Take Your Job?, THE ECONOMIST (June 27, 2019), http://www.e
conomist.com/business/2019/06/27/will-a-robot-really-take-your-job (explaining that a
previous misunderstanding of an academic study led to exaggerated fears of the likelihood
of job loss due to automation).
92. See id. (discussing evidence that there is a long history of automation fears dating
back to the industrial revolution and that technological displacement may create different
jobs).
93. See, e.g., Walter A. Hill, The Impact of EDP Systems on Office Employees: Some
Empirical Conclusions, 9 ACAD. MGMT. J. 9 (1966) (finding that, at the time, automation
was likely to increase management employment while reducing clerical workers); Leon C.
Megginson, Management in Perspective Automation: Our Greatest Asset—Our Greatest
Problem?, 6 ACAD. MGMT. J. 232 (1963) (arguing that automation would lead to positive
economic changes and encourage employee adaptability).
94. For example, New York’s governor has recently appointed a panel of experts and
policy makers to evaluate the economic, workforce, and ethical implications of robots on the
state. Jimmy Vielkind, New York State Creates Group to Study Rise of Robots, WALL ST. J.,
July 24, 2019.
95. See, e.g., GALLUP, STATE OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 4 (2017) (finding that
between 2012 and 2016, “the number of employees working remotely rose by four
percentage points, from 39% to 43%, and employees working remotely spent more time
doing so”).
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for employees in terms of greater personal control over schedules and
autonomy, and also for employers through reductions in overhead expenses
and turnover, as well as for improving employee satisfaction.
Within all of these changes the most overarching change in the last
few decades is what has been called the boundaryless career.
96
This career
paradigm is one in which an individual can expect to have numerous jobs
across many employers over the course of their working life. This is an era
of increased job mobility where the individual who can adapt will have
opportunities for personal and professional growth across an industry or
industries and not simply within a single large employer.
Organizational studies scholars Arthur and Rousseau’s book The
Boundaryless Career: A New Employment Principle for a New Economic
Era was influential in explaining this new way of looking at employment
arrangements and defining it against the older, withering model of lifetime
employment with a single firm.
97
They explain this new arrangement in
contrast to the old order of predictable careers taking place over time in a
single organization that is a “bounded, or organizational career” of “orderly
employment arrangements achieved through vertical coordination in
mainly large, stable firms.”
98
Arthur and Rousseau write that the
organizational career had been “the dominant employment form through
the mid-1980s” that is no longer dominant.
99
As they further explain, a
boundaryless career is “the opposite of ‘organizational careers’––careers
conceived to unfold in a single employment setting.”
100
Finally, amongst all of these other changes, another important trend
among some workers is the emphasis on seeking meaningful work—often
of a socially conscious nature—with organizations that provide
opportunities to be personally fulfilled at work.
101
From the employer’s
perspective, this can be part of efforts to increase employee loyalty and
“buy-in” for the company’s mission that will ultimately benefit the
business. For example, there are estimates that at least thirty percent of
U.S. workers are disengaged at work alongside evidence that firms with
96. Michael B. Arthur & Denise M. Rousseau, Introduction: The Boundaryless Career
as a New Employment Principle, in THE BOUNDARYLESS CAREER 3 (Michael B. Arthur &
Denise M. Rousseau eds., 1996).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 5.
101. See Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A
Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 624–25 (2013)
(stating that companies were able to obtain better employees by being socially conscious).
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engaged workforces have better financial performance.
102
There is also
evidence that employers have adapted to gain an advantage in employee
recruiting by highlighting the socially conscious nature of their businesses
or other activities.
103
This desire for meaningful work can be addressed by
autonomy and self-directedness at work, including the participatory act of
job crafting by employees.
104
There are, nonetheless, limits on the type of
jobs and amenable workplaces that allow for job crafting.
105
The extent to which “mission matters” to all types of workers may be
hard to determine. For instance, there is evidence that younger and highly
educated workers tend to care about their employer’s social focus and
workplace quality more than other groups.
106
It may also be the case that
certain types of workers have the luxury of seeking employment with
mission-driven organizations and the wherewithal to find work in the most
accommodating workplaces.
While this shift toward less job security and investment in employees
may work well for some types of highly-sought-after, highly-skilled
workers, others in the labor force have found themselves with less power in
the employment relationship when it comes to things like bargaining over
restrictive covenants.
107
Moreover, the scale of for-profit employers in the
U.S. is changing, leading to a high concentration of power in a declining
number of large companies and a shift away from pensions to employer-
sponsored retirement savings plans.
108
With all of these changes to the
102. See GALLUP, supra note 95 (providing survey evidence that 33% of U.S. workers
are not engaged at work and asserting that engagement as measured by Gallup is related to
fostering high-performing firms).
103. Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 101 (discussing a perceived trend that
“[e]ntrepreneurs sought to hire the best talent and discovered the most efficient strategy for
achieving a competitive advantage was through differentiation. Due to competition, image
became a large element of employee recruiting.”).
104. See Justin M. Berg, Jane E. Dutton & Amy Wrzesniewski, Job Crafting and
Meaningful Work, in PURPOSE AND MEANING IN THE WORKPLACE 81, 81–86 (Bryan J. Dik,
Zinta S. Byrne & Michael F. Steger eds., 2013) (defining meaningful work concepts and
providing a review of the organizational behavior literature on the topic).
105. See id. at 99 (discussing the boundary limits of job crafting).
106. For some indication of this possible cream skimming of educated workers, see
Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 101, at 624.
107. See generally Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and
Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1
(2012) (applying concepts of autonomy and employee choice to the contracting relationship
between employers and employees).
108. See, e.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED
AMERICA 191 (2009) (discussing the shift of employees as pension-holders to investors as
traditional benefit plans have evolved to 401(k) plans and as employees thus become
participants in the financial markets).
328 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:2
workplace and increased uncertainty for workers, hybrid entities may
potentially play a sort of mediating role in the modern employee-employer
relationship. The next section examines the potential for benefit
corporations to provide an ideal business structure for fostering employee
welfare, including along this job satisfaction dimension.
III. BENEFITCORPORATIONS ANDB CORPS: THE EMPLOYEE
INTERESTSDIMENSION
Building on the above discussion on some of the trends in the U.S.
workplace, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility, this
section now explains a theoretical view of the employer-employee
relationship in light of Psychological Contract Theory. With that context,
the section then begins a further inquiry into the usefulness and promise of
hybrid organizations, specifically the benefit corporation legal structure and
B Corps. This Part first discusses the state of the employer-employee
psychological contract, applies the psychological contract theory to hybrid
organizations, and then examines the likelihood that businesses such as
benefit corporations and B Corps provide an advantageous business
structure for maximizing employee-stakeholder welfare.
A. The Psychological Contract Theory in Employment
The discussion of psychological contract theory (“PCT”) chiefly
comes from the work of organizations and scholars conducting this work
since the mid 1990s.
109
This conception of the unwritten contract
surrounding the formal employment agreement is useful to understanding
not only traditional for-profit employment, but, as discussed below, this
theory can also shed light on the employer-employee relationship
developing among hybrid entities and their employees.
Essentially, PCT posits that the employer-employee relationship is
marked by the parties’ understanding of the nature of the relationship and
expectations for current and future interactions, which are shaped by forces
like culture and law.
110
Unlike explicit or implicit agreements recognized
by law, the abstract psychological contract sets the terms for things as
varied as expectations of job tenure, employer-provided training, or even
flexible work hours, which are not necessarily legally enforceable rights.
111
109. See, e.g., ROUSSEAU, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note
21 (providing a theory of psychological contracting).
110. Rousseau, Psychological Contracts in the United States, supra note 21.
111. Id.
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In this evolving world of workplace expectations, Katherine Stone has
discussed the “new psychological contract” at work in the context of
human capital law and policy research.
112
As she explains, “the term
‘psychological contract’ refers to an individual’s beliefs about the terms of
his or her employment contract . . . It is a subjective concept, expressing an
individual’s belief in the existence of a bilateral relationship with his or her
employer.”
113
Under an older psychological contract, workers provided their long-
term loyalty to employers in exchange for an implicit promise of long-term
employment. However, with the shifts in the labor market, the new
psychological contract in the workplace is marked by the use of short-term
employment relationships where the reciprocal loyalty between employers
and employees is fleeting. This, as discussed in Part III, is related to the
reality that modern workers understand that they will have many jobs
throughout their careers.
This new psychological contract can lead to both efficiencies and
advantageous flexibility for both parties, such as the most desirable
workers achieving wage gains associated with job-switching across
competitors.
114
In this short-term focused model, however, there may be
less incentive or time for employers to invest in their employees. This
changed workplace that is populated by a higher percentage of contingent
workers with diminished loyalty to their current employer may itself lead to
less job satisfaction for employees.
115
As Professor Stone has demonstrated, the demise of the traditional
internal labor markets within firms has complicated other positive aspects
of the employer-employee relationship in the modern, boundaryless
context—namely employee commitment and organizational citizenship
behavior.
116
This evolution means that, despite the decline of long-term
relationships, “[f]irms can no longer succeed if employees simply perform
their tasks in a reliable but routine manner . . . [t]hey need employees to
commit their imagination, energies, and intelligence on behalf of the
firm.”
117
This leads to a paradoxical situation for employees. Employers want
the best and most motivated employees with a high degree of commitment
112. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLAL. REV. 519 (2001).
113. Id. at 549–50.
114. Rousseau, Psychological Contracts in the United States, supra note 21, at 263–65.
115. Davis-Blake & Broschak, supra note 75, at 482–83.
116. Stone, supra note 112, at 556.
117. Id.
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to the firm, but the same firms do not offer a reciprocal level of
commitment. The older model allowed for loyalty from both parties in the
psychological contract in which the employee could rely on an implicit
promise to move within the firm as long as their performance was
satisfactory. This was a system of long-term relationships and, for some,
lifetime employment with the same large firm. The current model, in
contrast, eliminates that promise.
For employees with the requisite skills and mobility, the new
psychological contract can still be rewarding. The prototypical example of
the worker who thrives in the new world is a highly skilled Silicon Valley
software engineer who moves easily from employer to employer based on
where the newest and most highly-compensated work with the best mix of
benefits is available. However, other workers who are unable to adapt and
do not possess the general skills needed to succeed get left behind in terms
of missing the benefits of job mobility. Those employees may falter in
their careers and encounter forced mobility when their employer’s needs
change and without the traditional internal market at a large firm to provide
retraining and other opportunities.
B. A New Psychological Benefit Contract: Hybrid Entities and
Employees
The new psychological contract described above in terms of the
overall private sector workforce may seem disheartening for employees.
Yet, in the context of the emerging set of hybrid organizations, there is an
opportunity for a new version of the psychological contract in employment
that is overtly employee-focused. I call this new implicit arrangement that
is embedded in the employee-employer relationship of hybrid organizations
a “psychological benefit contract” or “PBC.” Placing this arrangement in
terms of a benefit contract is, in part, to recognize that the structure of these
firms specifically includes the goal of considering an employee dimension
in decision-making.
This hybrid organization-specific psychological contract is initially
determined by the framing embedded in the stated purpose of these
organizations to pursue both social and financial performance. In the case
of the benefit corporation, the legal requirements of incorporation dictate
that the hybrid organization must consider employees’ interests—even
retired employees—in any decision that affects that important stakeholder
group.
118
The required consideration of stakeholder impact is the defining
118. The legal and structural elements of benefit corporations and B Corps concerning
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mechanism enabling the psychological benefit contract. This means that
the employer is bound to provide more process and consideration to
employees than is the case for traditional corporations.
This requirement seemingly institutionalizes the positive treatment of
employees that may be possible, but not legally formalized, with any
hybrid organization that lacks this legal designation. Thus, the
psychological benefit contract in a benefit corporation is defined first by
the legal commitment to take a stakeholder view of corporate purpose.
119
Second, beyond the legal aspects of the commitment to employees, benefit
corporation employees will perhaps have more intangible assurances that
come with their elevated status. The positive branding of the organization
is likely to attract employees interested in the hybrid’s dual mission,
whatever the exact focus of the social goals. With that comes some
implicit promises to somehow reward those employees that are also
motivated to assist in pursuing that mission. The rewards are likely to
include an appreciation of their voice and participation in the organizations
and access to internal labor markets akin to the old psychological contract
relationship.
In the case of certified B Corps, the psychological benefit contract has
a similar basis in the initial framework of the hybrid entity and its pursuit
of financial and social goals. B Corp certification is even more employee-
centric than just a benefit corporation structure because of the extra layer of
voluntarily-assumed process, and mechanisms for voice and management
participation required to achieve the designation. In either case, because
these hybrid forms focus on social outcomes through accountability
measures, they will appeal to certain workers that share these values, such
as younger workers.
120
B Corp compliance provides an additional layer of attention to
employees, and thus forms a strong psychological benefit contract, by
adding in several elements to the employer-employee relationship that are
employee-stakeholders is discussed supra Part I.A.
119. Notably, the legal enforcement mechanism—the benefit enforcement proceeding—
may be less than effective in assuring that the employee-stakeholder focus is implemented
as designed in the documents of incorporation. This important issue is discussed, infra, in
Part III.C.
120. See Chris Miller, Millennials and Hybrid Legal Structures Are Here to Stay, STAN.
SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Jul. 1, 2016), http://www.ssir.org/articles/entry/millennials_and_hy
brid_legal_structures_are_here_to_stay [https://perma.cc/J4LS-MW94] (arguing that
“[m]illennials and the movement to pioneer hybrid legal structures—new business forms
that incorporate aspects of both nonprofits and for-profits—are animated by the same
historic forces,” and that both are motivated by the shared values of authenticity,
transparency, and accountability, and are sector-agnostic for how their goals are achieved).
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largely absent from traditional corporations. For example, B Corp
employees are assured that they will have mechanisms to exercise their
voice within the organization because of the available structures to express
their views and concerns. B Corps are likely to integrate more
opportunities for employees to participate in management decisions, which
is a way to make employee voice more tangible. Certified B Corps may
provide varying degrees of participation opportunities, such as participation
on management boards, joint ownership opportunities, and the other ways
for employees to have an influence over company policies and decisions.
Another element of the psychological benefit contract between
employees and the B Corp is that the voice and participation mechanisms
may include employee empowerment and training opportunities to build
skills related to the company and its dual missions. These opportunities
can directly impact the employee’s ability to advance—internally or
externally—in their career development. Such advancement can include
their personal satisfaction and fulfillment, but also the increase in
measurable employee welfare metrics such as job tenure, greater
employment benefits and retirement savings, and simply increased
compensation.
One possible effect of these opportunities for employees that are tied
to the B Corp’s structure is that there are also reciprocal advantages for the
hybrid organization on the other side of the psychological benefit contract.
The hybrid employer—whether a benefit corporation and/or a B Corp—
will have expectations that the employees will be more committed to the
entity’s mission in a way that exceeds assumptions about employees at
single-mission for-profit companies where employees operate under a new
psychological contract that focuses their efforts at career advancement
outside of the firm. Those same employees will be participating in the
hybrid’s management and decision-making and the employer can rely on
the collective expertise, paired with potentially more institutional
knowledge from longer-employed workers, to improve both the social and
economic missions.
The psychological benefit contract, thus, can be summed up as having
reciprocal expectations and potential advantages for both the hybrid
organization and for the employees. These expectations stem from the very
hybrid nature of an organization with a stakeholder as well as a profit-
making focus. Employees will expect more opportunities for participation
and voice, as well as opportunities for training, and access to increased
benefits and internal labor markets. On the other side of the benefit
contract, the benefit corporation or B Corp is able to count on a high level
of loyalty and commitment to the hybrid’s dual missions, as well as
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perhaps the employee’s willingness to compromise on some parameters
such as competitive compensation. In the most positive view of the
psychological benefit contract, both the interests of the employer and the
employee are aligned so that both are enthusiastically striving for a
common mission. The next section goes further and explores what are
some of the positive outcomes of the benefit contract in employment, as
well as some of the potential drawbacks, when viewed critically from an
employee welfare dimension.
C. Do Hybrid Entities Truly Protect and Empower Employees?
In light of the new psychological benefit contract with hybrid
organizations, the next issue is to evaluate how employees of these entities
actually fare in terms of their personal welfare and other outcomes. This
section first presents a specific example of certified B Corps that underwent
a major transition phase and then discusses the employee-focused aspects
of the benefit corporate structure generally. Ultimately, the section
evaluates benefit corporations on various employee welfare dimensions to
determine if these entities are able to maximize employee interests in a
manner that is superior to other existing legal formation options.
Etsy, the popular online marketplace for handmade and artisanal
items, is perhaps the cautionary tale for social entrepreneurs, particularly
those who dream of taking their business ideas to scale. As it grew
quickly, Etsy remained known as a socially-driven company that was
heralded as a champion of stakeholder engagement and progressive
business practices operating an online marketplace. The company
eventually became a certified B Corp, but not a benefit corporation, a
designation that was not originally available in the State of Delaware where
Etsy is incorporated.
121
Etsy embraced and marketed its status as a socially
responsible company and, since it became a certified B Corp in 2012, Etsy
was able to raise its B Corp certification score by twenty-five points.
122
The company was also known as an exceptional place to work. For
example, Etsy reported an 80% employee satisfaction rate in 2013, which
121. See Alex Barinka, Etsy’s IPO Is a Direct Challenge to Wall Street’s Beliefs: Will
Investors Embrace a Company that Says it Cares About More than the Bottom Line?,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-02/ets
y-s-ipo-is-a-direct-challenge-to-wall-street-s-beliefs [https://perma.cc/4UXF-U347] (stating
that Etsy has been a certified B Corp for over three years).
122. Katie Hunt-Morr, Etsy’s 2013 Values & Impact Annual Report, ETSY (Feb. 13,
2014), https://blog.etsy.com/news/2014/etsy-values-impact-annual-report-2013/ [https://per
ma.cc/ HBE4-7EF7].
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was 20% higher than the United States company average at the time.
123
Etsy is particularly notable for the precedent that it set when becoming
a publicly-traded company in the 2015, which made it the largest certified
B Corp ever listed on an exchange.
124
With the new pressures of dispersed
shareholders, some wondered if Etsy could continue a tradition of
extraordinary treatment of its employees.
125
These employee-centric
initiatives at Etsy had included providing a majority of the cost of
healthcare, wages in excess of a living wage, and perks like pay for time
volunteering outside of work time and organic meals at the office.
126
Of
note is that Etsy was never a benefit corporation, but would have had to
convert to that format in the future to maintain its status as a certified B
Corp incorporated in Delaware—although that change became more
difficult to undertake because of the required shareholder vote once the
company went public.
127
The issue was that under B Lab rules, Etsy had to
have become a benefit corporation by August 2017 or lose its B Corp
status.
128
Etsy’s choice to not convert to a benefit corporation prior to
going public may have been related to concerns about negative reaction
from potential investors.
129
Once Etsy became a public company, it was closely watched for signs
that it is straying from its social aims and emphasis on all stakeholders, not
just shareholders.
130
In particular, as the company grew and faced the
123. ETSY, ETSY VALUES & IMPACT ANNUAL REPORT 2013 26 (2014), http://blog.etsy.co
m/news/files/2014/02/Etsy-Progress-Report_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/ Z825-BKLU]
124. In April 2015, Etsy filed its Form S-1 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to begin the public offering process. Barinka, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. See id. (“At Etsy, this includes giving all employees 40 hours of paid volunteer time
every year, paying employees more than 40 percent above the local living wage, and
covering 80 percent of workers’ health insurance premiums, according to the company’s
2013 Values & Impact Annual Report.”).
127. See Therese Poletti, Etsy IPO Challenges Company’s Socially Conscious
Reputation, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/etsy-ipo-c
hallenges-companys-socially-conscious-reputation-2015-04-07 [https://perma.cc/QW4R-8Q
A5] (writing that a shareholder vote is now required).
128. See Gelles, supra note 18. Etsy later received an extension from B Lab in which to
incorporate under the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute, the company’s new
management the B Corp certification was abandoned. Id.
129. One leading commentator, for instance speculates “that the company’s investment
bankers, led by Goldman Sachs, and its lawyers, may have advised Etsy against becoming a
benefit corporation before the IPO” because “[n]obody wants to be first, they don’t want to
make mistakes, there is no precedent, they don’t want financial exposure” and “a company
committed to the social good in addition to profits is often viewed unfavorably by stock
investors.” Poletti, supra note 127.
130. As one journalist put it, “[w]ill life as a public company change Etsy? We’ll know
by 2017.” Id.
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pressures of stockholders to act with shorter-term interests in mind, it was
closely watched to see if the benefits to employees remain or get lost to
cost cutting in the name of profit generation. Moreover, Etsy would serve
as an important test case to see if a socially-minded company can scale up
and still live its stakeholder-focused values: will employees remain highly
satisfied with their jobs and how will the pressures of the market impact
employee welfare at the company?
The first few years of Etsy’s life as a public company have been
difficult on a few dimensions. Issues with further scaling the company
have led to periods of declining growth and then shareholder concerns,
which have come to threaten its “high-minded long-term mission.”
131
With
the new pressure to perform financially, one CEO was fired and the new
CEO has made hundreds of further job cuts, with the obvious harm to
employee morale.
132
Some of the employee perks and the Etsy culture have
changed amid the new pressures of being a public company, leading some
to question the ability of hybrid companies to maintain all of their founding
values, at least if they aspire to larger scale operations and financial
success.
133
Despite the demise of some of Etsy’s social and employee-centric
initiatives when faced with the harshness of public market shareholder
pressures, do benefit corporations (and B Corps) uniquely create positive
spillovers for employee stakeholders? Do these hybrid entities treat
employers better than other legal forms? To address these questions, this
section next examines the likelihood that benefit corporations have a
positive impact on employee welfare and interests, including workplace
quality and wages, job satisfaction, including branding to attract
131. See Gelles, supra note 18. In describing Etsy’s concerns after its initial public
offering, one profile of the company pointed out that:
once Etsy went public in 2015, it was evaluated just like any other company
traded on the stock market. By late last year, expenses were growing fast. And
even as the company reported $88 million in revenues during the third quarter,
it posted a net loss of $2.5 million. After a few quarters of tepid results,
investors grew impatient and a classic clash of corporate governance came
spilling into view - how would a company like Etsy balance the short-term
demands of its shareholders with its high-minded long-term mission?
Id.
132. See Gelles, supra note 18.
133. Id. (noting that Esty is likely to see financial growth under the new management
and with cost cutting, “but it may never again be the sensitive community fostered by [the
found and previous CEO],” and “[o]nce a beacon of socially responsible business practices
with a starry-eyed work force that believed it could fundamentally reimagine commerce,
Etsy has over the past year become a case study in how the short-term pressures of the stock
market can transform even the most idealistic of companies”).
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employees, and the participatory role of employees in corporate
governance, including the promotion of employee voice. This section also
discusses the issues of employee benefit enforcement proceedings as a
possible mechanism for protecting employee interests, in addition to other
attributes of the benefit corporation model, such as the third-party
certification process.
i. Workplace Quality and Wages
From B Lab’s perspective, it is clear that employees see advantages
with these sorts of hybrid social enterprises related to workplace quality.
For instance, the B Lab website claims that “B Corps create higher quality
jobs and improve the quality of life in our communities” and “[a]s a result
of our collective success, individuals and communities will enjoy greater
economic opportunity, society will address its most challenging
environmental problems, and more people will find fulfillment by bringing
their whole selves to work.”
134
While there does not appear to be research
yet on some traditional measurements of workplace quality, like worker
safety on the job, there is of course anecdotal evidence of the quality of B
Corp and benefit corporation offices and job sites, including increased
efforts by manufacturers such as Patagonia to improve working conditions
in factories as a member of the Fair Labor Association.
135
Competitive wages also matter for attracting and retaining talented
workforces, and B Lab recognizes that with a certification metric related to
the percentage of a company’s workers receiving a living wage. Although,
it must be noted that what employees’ value in a workplace is a complex
question, and salary is not always at the top of the list of what matters in a
particular position.
136
134. Why B Corps Matter, SISTEMA B, http://www.sistemab.org/en/b-corp/why-b-corps-
matter/ [https://perma.cc/T85F-LPRH].
135. See Patagonia, Beyond Factory Audits with the FLA, THE CLEANEST LINE (Nov. 9,
2010), https://www.patagonia.com/blog/2010/11/beyond-factory-audits-with-the-fla/ [https:/
/perma.cc/64UK-GKPB] (discussing Patagonia’s audit by the Fair Labor Association and
compliance with CSR procedures).
136. Interestingly, for employees several factors, including a company’s values, matter
more than salary. A recent large scale survey of workers found that, for U.S. workers, the
top 10 workplace factors that matter most are: 1. Company’s financial stability; 2. Good
relationships with superiors; 3. Good work-life balance; 4. Company values; 5. Appreciation
for your work; 6. Good relationships with colleagues; 7. Job security; 8. Interesting job
content; 9. Employer reputation; 10. Attractive fixed salary. Rainer Strack, et al., U.S.
Workers: A Little Less Swagger, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP & NETWORK (Oct. 6, 2014), http
s://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/human_resources_leadership_talent_us_wor
kers_little_less_swagger/ [https://perma.cc/3BN9-UWKQ].
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Another feature of benefit corporations broadly related to
compensation is that, for employees from certain backgrounds, there are
loan forgiveness programs from a handful of business schools. At least
three high-profile business schools—New York University’s Stern School
of Business, Yale School of Management, and Columbia Business
School—have extended their loan forgiveness programs to cover graduates
employed at benefit corporations or other social enterprises, like certified B
Corps.
137
Interestingly, working at a B Corp, or for that matter any mission-
driven organization, and being satisfied with the work might actually
suppress wages for employees. If employees value intangible benefits from
their work and derive value from working for a socially minded
organization, they may be willing to accept lower wages.
138
Over time it is
also possible that salaries at mission-focused entities will not grow as fast
as in for-profit companies. Moreover, it is possible that benefit corporation
employees will choose to stay in their current position longer because of
the company’s attractive values and intangible benefits, and thus forgo the
possible wage increases from job mobility.
139
ii. Job Satisfaction and Branding for Employees
A commonly accepted value of the benefit corporation and B Corp is
that the hybrid form provides a differentiator in branding between the
social mission usually associated with nonprofit organizations and the
efficiency of for-profits.
140
One of the reasons for adopting the benefit
137. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 52 (discussing the labor cost aspects of social
enterprises, including loan forgiveness options and suggesting that the programs “could
have a significant impact on attracting talent to social enterprises”).
138. See id. (stating that “even without loan repayment, prospective employees may be
willing to accept a somewhat lower salary if they believe the company is socially and
environmentally responsible”).
139. Whether benefit corporations actually provide higher wages relative to other entities
is an empirical question that, to my knowledge, has not yet been addressed. The best
comparison may be to nonprofits since they are, like benefit corporations, mission driven.
140. Reiser, supra note 7, at 622. Professor Reiser explains that “[n]onprofits, in
essence, sell their halo. When they offer products to consumers, affiliations to partners, and
jobs to employees, they are selling a sense of righteousness or trustworthiness, or both.” In
contrast, she adds, “[f]or-profits sell efficiency. They offer products of the highest quality
and lowest price, affiliations to draw in revenue, jobs that pay a market wage, and training
in efficient business operations.” But what about social entrepreneurs who have one foot in
both sectors? Those entities, Reiser explains, “see themselves as offering something quite
different. The profit motive makes them lean, efficient, innovative. But, their social
mission keeps them virtuous and responsible. Thus, neither traditional nonprofit nor for-
profit forms send the right message.” Id.
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corporation is branding. This is because the choice of the legal benefit
corporation form and the discipline of third-party certification broadcasts a
signal to markets and stakeholders that the entity will intentionally blend
business and social goals.
141
For example, one of the reasons B Lab cites
for “Why Companies Certify” is for employers to “Attract Talent.”
142
Closely related to the concept of employee branding in this case is the
issue of individual employee identity. In the hybrid entity context, the
psychological benefit contract can connect to the employee’s identity-
related desires to feel good about their work and their employer—
essentially garnering some intangible, yet valuable, affinity for the
organization’s mission.
143
This is consistent with findings about the
internal benefits of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to employees by
potentially fulfilling their psychological needs and other positive
impacts.
144
One reason branding could be important as an indication of greater
employee welfare is that the third-party certification to benefit reports
could lead to a virtuous cycle where the benefit corporation’s managers
value and reward employees in order to maintain the certification and
improve the worker welfare ratings in, for instance, the company’s B Lab-
monitored B Impact Report. The reported findings on employee
satisfaction at companies like Etsy (in the period before its public offering)
seem to bolster that claim.
145
However, branding a company as socially
conscious or “good” to work for, is not a new technique that the benefit
corporation model can claim as having pioneered.
146
Moreover, other more
established reporting and accountability standards, including ones with a
worker welfare component like the Global Reporting Initiative, already
exist.
147
Ultimately, benefit corporation reporting will be most useful if it is
141. See id. at 592 (citing “four reasons why social entrepreneurs view hybrid
organizational forms attractive: articulating and enforcing a dual mission, expanding
funding streams, branding their enterprises, and achieving sustainability”).
142. B Lab, Certification, https://www.bcorporation.net/certification [https://perma.cc /5
E6V-SFQE].
143. James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 461,
509 (2015) (explaining how the breakdown of the old psychological contract fits in a
context of how individual identity of works may be stronger within non-profit enterprises).
144. See Shuili Du, C. B. Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen, Corporate Social Responsibility,
Multi-faceted Job-Products, and Employee Outcomes, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 319, 320 (2015)
(studying the impacts of CSR activity on positive employee outcomes).
145. ETSY, supra note 123, at 26.
146. Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 101, at 624.
147. GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES:
REPORTING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDDISCLOSURES (2013), https://www.globalreporting.or
g/resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf [https://
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shown to provide a superior level of disclosure and accountability through
things like B Labs’ random on-site audit of the B Corps it certifies.
While benefit corporations might attain a level of authenticity
148
by
taking on extra fiduciary and reporting duties toward their social mission, it
is unclear if that alone will ensure a better environment for employees over
the long term. The risk is that branding to attract employees who value
mission-driven employers will devolve into merely marketing and a sort of
“virtue washing” at the expense of genuine dedication to improving
society. Nonetheless, while it is difficult to draw conclusions about
employee welfare from the reporting requirement, there remains an
“embeddedness” factor. In other words, benefit corporations take on a
voluntary mandate to consider “the employees and workforce of the benefit
corporation, its subsidiaries and suppliers”
149
and that orientation may
indeed set a positive and sustainable tone for the entire organization.
iii. Enforcement Mechanisms for Employee Welfare
The transparency, and the likely related accountability, coming from
the required reporting on employee issues for benefit corporations and B
Corps is an important part of publicizing and cataloging employee welfare.
Yet, if actually promoting employee interests and participation is not
required, per se, by the hybrid structures, are there more concrete
mechanisms for enforcing employee welfare in these entities beyond the
boundaries set up by employment law that apply to workers in any
business?
The accountability mechanism unique to benefit corporations is the
often discussed benefit enforcement proceeding.
150
The proceeding is
described in § 305 “Right of Action” of the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation.
151
Standing to use the proceeding mechanism is limited to the
entity itself, a director of the entity, owners of 2% of outstanding shares, or
perma.cc/D6DV-8SYL].
148. See, e.g., B Lab, Certification, https://www.bcorporation.net/certification
(describing how companies may obtain an additional certification as a benefit corporation).
149. Clark et al., supra note 8, at 11 (citing § 301 of the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation).
150. See Jacob Hasler, Note, Contracting for Good: How Benefit Corporations
Empower, 100 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1319 (2014) (“Shareholders can enforce director
compliance in a number of ways: by initiating a benefit enforcement proceeding, by starting
a proxy contest, or by voting for governance terms that require regular auditing of directors’
actions, as in certified B Corps.”).
151. Clark et al., supra note 8, at 19.
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5% owners of the benefit corporation’s parent entity.
152
In theory, other
persons with standing to use the proceeding can be authorized to do so in
the benefit corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.
153
Although
the inclusion of employees as “other persons with standing” could be added
to the corporate documents, that seems unlikely, in part because of the fear
of nuisance suits related to a broader definition of parties with standing to
use the enforcement proceeding.
154
As scholars have pointed out, the benefit enforcement proceeding is
an imperfect mode of ensuring stakeholder protection. This is the case,
“because only shareholders (and a few internal stakeholders) possess the
right to sue, employees and various external stakeholders might not be
protected, especially given the statutory bar from liability, except in the
most extreme circumstances.”
155
The enforcement proceeding can
represent a form of legal risk for benefit companies; however, thus far there
are few if any examples of reported litigation using this derivative action
option.
156
By design, employees and other non-owner stakeholders are excluded
from the right to sue a benefit corporation using the new benefit
enforcement proceeding. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that employees or
others effectively use the mechanism to force compliance with the
consideration or substantive elements of employee interests. Theoretically,
a right of redress for employees could be added to the corporate documents,
or employees could qualify for standing if they are also a director or at least
a 2% owner. While both cases are possible, however, it seems increasingly
unlikely that as benefit corporations grow and mature any single employee
will continue to qualify as a significant enough of an owner to achieve
standing under those terms.
Another option to enforce compliance with a duty to consider
employees or other stakeholders would be if the duty was spelled out
152. See id. (referring to § 305 (b) (1)-(2) of the Model Legislation).
153. See id. (referring to § 305 (b) (iv) of the Model Legislation).
154. The potential problem of nuisance suits if the standing to sue is too expansive is
raised as a justification to § 305 in the Comment that immediately follows the draft
language for that section. Id. at 20.
155. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 366 (2014).
156. See Jesse Finfrock & Eric L. Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1881–82 (2014) (finding only one case using a benefit
enforcement proceeding). See also Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the
Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-
Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863 (2013) (discussing the idea of having a
corporate entity in which profit seeking and the public good are united aims).
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contractually in employment agreements. Along those lines, a collective
bargaining agreement could function as a mechanism to protect employees,
although unionization could put workers in opposition to employers from a
bargaining and overall workplace cooperation perspective. Ideally, in such
a stakeholder-friendly model, employer-employee cooperation should be
the norm. However, either option seems unworkable and unlikely given
the current nature and size of most hybrid entities. In any event, a contract
enforcement option is not unique to the benefit corporation structure and
requires significant ex ante bargaining that would need to include
discussion of broader than usual stakeholder goals, with meaningful build-
in protection mechanisms.
iv. Employee Participation and Voice
Another important element of employee welfare is the extent to which
an organization allows for employee participation. The level of
transparency and accountability provided by the third-party certification
and reporting is a particularly promising aspect of benefit corporations
when it comes to promoting employee welfare. Employee voice is
important both as a management tool for business decision-making, but
also has impact on employee happiness and engagement in the
workplace.
157
There is also evidence that the empowerment of employees
in B Corps enables those employees, because of their ownership and
meaningful participation in the entity, to act as effective managers of
external stakeholders.
158
In contrast, poorly designed organizational
structures and management issues can lead to the negative situation of
employee silence in the workplace.
159
157. See generally Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Speaking Up,
Remaining Silent: The Dynamics of Voice and Silence in Organizations, 40 J. MGMT. STUD.
1353 (2003) (reviewing the literature on employee voice and reasons for employee silence).
158. See Anne‐Laure P. Winkler, Jill A. Brown & David L. Finegold, Employees as
Conduits for Effective Stakeholder Engagement: An Example from B Corporations, J. BUS.
ETHICS 1 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3924-0 [https://perma.cc/5NWP-8BG
6] (examining whether there is a link between employee ownership and involvement and
their association with external stakeholder engagement).
159. Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier
to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 712–14
(2000). In their article Professors Morrison and Milliken identify organizational structures,
policies, and practices related to the promotion or suppression of employee voice. They
explain, “that when the unspoken yet dominant ideology within an organization is that (1)
employees are self-interested, (2) management knows best, and (3) disagreement is bad,
then management will erect structures and policies that either do not facilitate or that
discourage upward information flow.” Id. at 712–13. Then Morrison and Milliken argue
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Although benefit corporations are not generally focused on employee
voice promotion as an outcome, the reporting structure and stakeholder
consciousness of the model makes it more likely that employee
participation and employee voice is fostered.
160
This is, in part, due to the
greater likelihood that benefit corporations will take employee opinions and
input into account more than traditional corporations because of the third-
party reporting requirements. For instance, the B Corp certification
requires quantifying worker welfare on dimensions like worker
communication mechanisms, the percentage of employees with a living
wage, and employee ownership.
161
Moreover, by definition, benefit
corporations and certified B Corps are designed to take into account
employee-stakeholder interests and to balance those interests with the
traditional profit-making role of all businesses.
v. Alleviation of Negative Trends in the Employment Landscape
Part II above discussed some of the important trends in the U.S.
employment environment in relation to the state of employee welfare and
the sometimes precarious position of employees in the American
workplace. Whether or not benefit corporations alleviate some of the
negative trends affecting workers is an important question to add to this
discussion.
One way to frame and subsequently explore the issues is to return to
the issue of a new psychological benefit contract in the hybrid entity
workplace. In doing so, it is important to keep in mind that hybrid entities
still have a relatively short track record in the economy with which to
assess their relationship with employees. Despite the many positive aspects
of the Psychological Benefit Contract for hybrid entities’ employees, there
are, however, potential tradeoffs for the employee that are often ignored or
that “[t]his tendency will be reinforced by managers’ desire to avoid any threatening
information or feedback. Two common structural features of organizations dominated by
these beliefs will be high centralization of decision making and lack of formal upward
feedback mechanisms.” Id. at 713.
160. See Frances J. Milliken, Cindy M. Schipani, Norman D. Bishara & Andrea Prado,
Linking Workplace Practices to Community Engagement: The Case for Encouraging
Employee Voice 29 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 405, 415 (2015) (“Although [benefit corporation]
statues do not necessarily have an explicit voice-empowerment goal, increased opportunities
for employee voice are embedded in this new corporate governance structure.”).
161. See RYAN HONEYMAN, THE B CORP HANDBOOK: HOW TO USE BUSINESS AS A FORCE
FOR GOOD 53–55 (2014) (listing the elements of the “Quick Assessment of Worker Impact”
metric for the required categories of compensation, benefits, and wages reporting).
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glossed over in discussions of the virtues of benefit corporations and
certified B Corps. Certainly, these types of entities will also appeal to
employees who share their mission-based effort, even when professional
gains and compensation may be sacrificed. Employees may receive short-
term advantages like initial job satisfaction from the relationship as
promised, but employees also risk longer-term harms to their welfare, such
as stunted career advancement and reduced compensation. For example, in
agreeing to the hybrid-entity psychological contract, the employee may be
giving up advantages found in traditional for-profit entities, such as higher
wages, career advancement, and professional skills development often
afforded by larger and more market-based corporations where job mobility
is more readily available.
Nonetheless, ideally benefit corporations and B Corps will
demonstrate that they can provide longer term and higher quality
employment opportunities, as well as invest in their workforces. The
incentive to invest in employees may be high, in part, because as the
benefit corporation space becomes more crowded and competitive, these
entities will find themselves competing for talented employees—both from
the private sector and elsewhere. Yet, in the short term, benefit
corporations that are still in a startup stage may feel forced to rely on a
higher percentage of freelance and other types of contingent workers until
the company is larger and strong enough to support a workforce for the
long term. A positive view of the benefit corporation model does give
some hope that workers will be able to build a long-lasting and mutually
enriching psychological contract with benefit corporations.
CONCLUSION
Assessing the employee welfare dimension of benefit corporations is a
complex undertaking, and this Article is an attempt to begin that research
process. This current research endeavor has looked at these emerging
issues for hybrid entities and their employees in the context of the changing
nature of the U.S. workplace, as well as from employee voice,
compensation, and enforcement of stakeholder salience perspectives. From
those perspectives, it seems that the benefit corporation form and B Corp
certification have the potential to be innovative vehicles for employee
voice and participation because of the mission-driven nature of the
company and the depth of required reporting on employee issues. The
benefit corporation model and B Corp’s propensity to deliver superior
employee compensation and other workplace benefits is difficult to
measure and may not be known until further research is conducted as these
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entities mature and grow. There is also a distinct possibility that there may
be tradeoffs in terms of pay and traditional employee benefits for
employees who want the potential psychological rewards of working for
mission-driven hybrid organizations.
In addition, the most effect mechanisms for effectively enforcing a
benefit corporation’s promise to consider stakeholder interests and
particularly important employee interests remains uncertain. As Professor
Reiser concludes, “the benefit corporation lacks robust mechanisms to
enforce dual mission, which will ultimately undermine its ability to expand
funding streams and create a strong brand for social enterprise as
sustainable organizations.”
162
Phrased in another, perhaps more cynical
way, “[t]he reality that corporate decision-making is largely a function of
corporate choice rather than corporate law is no less true for the new
benefit corporation. The B Corp legal regime no more guarantees that
those companies will make ‘socially responsible’ decisions than existing
law prevents directors from doing so.”
163
The important role for social entrepreneurs to promote employee
welfare as part of their mission is seemingly more tied to the fulfillment of
the third-party standards requirement than it is an automatic spillover of the
benefit corporation’s legal form. In other words, keeping up with the third-
party standards and making them part of the company’s “DNA” is crucial
for hybrid entities—whether a benefit corporation, B Corp or any social
enterprise—in order to stay true to the implicit promise to successfully
execute a dual business and social mission. Social entrepreneurs who opt
for benefit corporation formation or B Corp status have gone a long way
already to commit to going beyond the “being nice and getting credit for it”
superficial aspects of complying with bare minimum corporate social
responsibility norms. There remains, however, a risk of these hybrid
entities to overpromise but under deliver to stakeholders—including
employees and shareholders—and then end up alienating several crucial
constituencies simultaneously.
Finally, from the employee’s perspective, what matters is the
commitment of the B Corp or benefit corporation’s managers and directors
to properly represent stakeholder-promotion ideals, and not necessarily the
legal form of the entity or certification compliance. In contrast, another
potentially great risk to the legitimacy of the nascent benefit corporation
model and B Corp certification is that if these businesses do not live up to
their social enterprise ideals and the stated social mission—or if they fail at
162. Reiser, supra note 7, at 593.
163. Underberg, supra note 65.
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financial performance—then they will leave employees disillusioned and
more likely to leave for other organizations, perhaps somewhere else on the
non-profit to hybrid to for-profit spectrum.
